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Against Summary Judgment
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Abstract
Summary judgment today is what settlement was twenty-five years ago: an
increasingly popular and important form of dispute resolution, widely lauded
for its efficiency, that has just begun to capture the full attention of civil proce-
dure scholarship. Despite strong evidence that summary judgment violates the
right to jury trial in civil cases guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment, most
people assume this mechanism is necessary for our system to function at rea-
sonable cost. This Article calls that assumption into question, suggesting that
summary judgment actually costs us more than it saves and that our civil jus-
tice system would be both fairer and more efficient without it. Most cases that
now go to summary judgment would settle early rather than go to trial if those
were the only two options. By discouraging early settlement, summary judg-
ment imposes large costs because the lion's share of litigation takes place
before trial. Moreover, summary judgment creates a systemic pro-defendant
bias due to the pressure on judges to move their dockets along by terminating
cases rather than letting them proceed to trial.
Introduction
For centuries, the paradigm for resolving a legal dispute was a
trial.' But about twenty-five years ago, legal scholarship began to take
note of a shift away from that paradigm.2 Empirical studies demon-
strated that most cases were resolved by settlement rather than trial,
and although this trend was lamented by a few (including most fa-
mously Owen Fiss in his article Against Settlement) , it was supported
by two emerging pillars of the legal academy. One was the field of law
and economics, which welcomed settlement as a cheap and efficient
* Assistant Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Many thanks to
Jonathan Masur, Larry Solum, Suja Thomas, and Spencer Waller for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts. Matthew Schimka's outstanding research assistance also contributed mightily to
this Article.
1 See, e.g., Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury Trial in America, 62 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 285, 285 (1999) ("Americans have relied on juries of ordinary citizens to resolve their
civil disputes since the beginning of the colonial period.").
2 E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the
Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv. 485, 502 (1985) ("Over 90% of all cases
(both civil and criminal) are currently settled and taken out of the system and, thus, are unavail-
able for common law rule making."); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374,
404 (1982).
3 Owen Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
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alternative to adjudication. 4 The other was the field of alternative dis-
pute resolution, which grouped settlement with mediation and arbitra-
tion as less adversarial means of working through disagreements. 5
Settlement was a boon to both litigants and the court system because
it avoided the costs of trial. With broad approval from judges, parties,
and academics, settlement was the new paradigm as the twentieth cen-
tury ended.
But settlement and trial are not the only ways to resolve a legal
dispute, and a third option has recently become so prominent as to
mirror the focus attracted by settlement in the early 1980s. 6 This new
option is pretrial adjudication, typically in the form of summary judg-
ment. When one party sues another, the defendant refuses to settle
and instead litigates-but with the hope of never seeing a jury. After
each side shows the other all of its relevant documents, propounds
interrogatories to the opposing party, and makes available its wit-
nesses for questioning via depositions, the parties ask the court to
grant judgment in their favor on the ground "that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law."'7
Judges now grant these motions so often8 that summary judgment
stands alongside trial and settlement as a pillar of our system.9 A de-
fendant ° can use this mechanism to rid itself of litigation without ei-
4 E.g., George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bar-
gaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 135 (1993) ("Litigation is a negative-sum proposition for the
litigants-the longer the process continues, the lower their aggregate wealth.").
5 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 504 ("Settlement can be particularized to the
needs of the parties, it can avoid win/lose, binary results, provide richer remedies than the com-
modification or monetarization of all claims, and achieve legitimacy through consent.").
6 See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil
Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 600 (2004).
7 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Although a party may move for summary judgment from the
beginning of a suit, FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-(b), the rule gives judges discretion to continue a
motion until further discovery has taken place, FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
8 See Burbank, supra note 6, at 592 ("[Tjhe rate of case termination by summary judg-
ment in federal civil cases nationwide increased substantially in the period between 1960 and
2000 ....").
9 See Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudi-
cations, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRI-
CAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 705 (2004) (using electronic docketing data to reach the "surprising
conclusions that a smaller percentage of cases were disposed of through settlement in 2000 than
was the case in 1970, [and] that vanishing trials have been replaced not by settlements but by
nontrial adjudication").
10 Although summary judgment can be granted in favor of either a plaintiff or a defen-
dant, it is granted far more often in favor of the defendant. Burbank, supra note 6, at 616 ("In
[fiscal year] 2000, judges in the Eastern District [of Pennsylvania] granted 293 motions for sum-
2007]
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ther risking trial or paying a settlement, and the refusal to settle might
discourage future lawsuits. Because summary judgment avoids the
time and expense of trial, it also appeals to commentators who prize
efficiency.11 It is thus a staple of how today's U.S. civil justice system
conducts business, and most view this state of affairs as a welcome
development. 12
Amid this movement toward an increasingly central role for sum-
mary judgment, there have been a few cautionary voices. When the
Supreme Court started us down this road twenty years ago by making
it easier for judges to grant summary judgment,'13 some scholars won-
dered whether the intended improvements in efficiency would materi-
alize 14 or whether the right to a jury trial was being unduly restricted. 15
And recently, a few scholars have begun to voice concerns that the
mary judgment (87 for plaintiffs and 206 for defendants). ... ); D. Theodore Rave, Note,
Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 900 n.142 (2006). Be-
cause the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts does not keep statistics on summary judg-
ment, Rave, supra, at 900, statistics must be calculated based on individual studies, e.g., Burbank,
supra note 6, at 616-18 (collecting data from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania), or audits of
sampled electronic docket information, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 9, at 712-23 (auditing elec-
tronic data for input error and compiling "corrected" data).
11 EDWARD J. BRUNET ET AL., SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (2d
ed. 2000) ("Rule 56 performs a 'workhorse' task in the federal procedural system and occupies
center stage in attaining the central goal of conserving the expenditure of judicial resources.").
12 See infra note 17.
13 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). This
"trilogy" drastically reduced barriers for granting summary judgment motions. Before the tril-
ogy, the judicial attitude toward summary judgment was perhaps best summed up by an Ala-
bama courthouse sign that read "No Spittin,' No Cussin' and No Summary Judgment." Susan T.
Wall, "No Spittin,' No Cussin' and No Summary Judgment": Rethinking Motion Practice, S.C.
LAW., June 1997, at 29, 29.
14 Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judg-
ment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 100 (1990) ("[C]hanges that facilitate judicial disposition of cases but
impede settlement may fail to relieve, if not exacerbate, court congestion."); see also Arthur R.
Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crises," and
Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
982, 1047 (2003) ("[C]ritics have questioned whether the [trilogy] decisions really will produce
gains in efficiency, pointing out that summary judgment motions take time to prepare, support,
and decide (realities that are likely to have been increased by the motion's post-1986 vitality),
often slow a case's forward progress, and typically save time only when granted." (citation
omitted)).
15 E.g., Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material
Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770, 775 (1988) ("[W]hen the moving party
would have the burden of persuasion at trial, the courts have ... strained to permit the granting
of the motion by interpreting the amendment not to include a strict submission of matters of
credibility to the jury, a questionable determination."); see also Paul W. Mollica, Federal Sum-
mary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARO. L. REV. 141, 141-42 (2000) ("[T]he increase in summary
dispositions of civil cases stirs fear that, in the haste to resolve weak cases, courts risk overriding
HeinOnline  -- 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 524 2006-2007
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summary judgment revolution might have gone too far. 16 But these
detractors have been all but drowned out in a sea of support for the
new regime of dispute resolution, and even the detractors object
merely to how often summary judgment is used, rather than to the fact
that it is used at all.17 Indeed, the idea of questioning the legitimacy of
summary judgment altogether is widely regarded as "a legal lunacy. '18
Against this backdrop, it makes sense that a forthcoming article
titled "Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional"' 19 has received
such intense interest and provoked such profound surprise.20 This ar-
ticle by Suja Thomas contends that summary judgment violates the
Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees the
right to a jury trial in civil cases. The argument is straightforward:
when we allow a judge to keep a plaintiff's lawsuit away from a jury
the constitutional imperatives of due process and the right to a civil jury trial under the Fifth and
Seventh Amendments.").
16 E.g., Miller, supra note 14, at 1047; Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76
TEx. L. REV. 1897, 1941 (1998) ("Its flame lit by Matsushita, Anderson, and Celotex in 1986, and
fueled by the overloaded dockets of the last two decades, summary judgment has spread swiftly
through the underbrush of undesirable cases, taking down some healthy trees as it goes."); Re-
becca Silver, Note, Standard of Review in FOIA Appeals and the Misuse of Summary Judgment,
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 731, 751-52 (2006) (lamenting that summary judgment has become the status
quo for Freedom of Information Act decisions, even when genuine issues of material fact exist);
Milton I. Shadur, An Old Judge's Thoughts, CBA REC., January 2004, at 27, 27 ("From my
perspective that trend has gone much too far, to the benefit of no one involved in the justice
system ....").
17 E.g., BRUNET ET AL., supra note 11, at 327 ("Summary judgment should be seen as a
potential expense-saving device to avoid an unnecessary trial."); Randy J. Kozel & David Rosen-
berg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L.
REV. 1849, 1853 (2004) ("[M]andating summary judgment as a condition precedent to entering
into an enforceable settlement agreement eliminates the potential payoff from nuisance-value
strategies, removing any incentive to employ them."); Georgene M. Vairo, Through the Prism:
Summary Judgment After the Trilogy (2003), in CIVIL PRACTICE AND LITIGATION TECHNIQUES
IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS, at 1543, 1564 (ALI-ABA, Coursebook, 2006) ("Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion [in Celotex] is a veritable ode to the superiority of summary judgment as a means
of fairly, efficiently and economically disposing of claims."); see also Martin H. Redish, Summary
Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329,
1335 (2005) ("Because the very purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials, one
need not be a trained logician to conclude that an increase in the availability of summary judg-
ment will naturally have a corresponding negative impact on the number of trials.").
18 Mollica, supra note 15, at 205.
19 Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139
(2007).
20 The article has attracted, as of this writing, 5149 abstract views and 1019 downloads on
the Social Science Research Network. See Social Science Research Network, http://papers.ssrn.
com/so13/papers.cfm?abstractid=886363 (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). It was also featured on two
leading Weblogs. Legal Theory Blog, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2006/02/suja-on-
thecon.html (Feb. 22, 2006, 18:33 CST); How Appealing, http://howappealing.law.com/022206.
html#011509 (Feb. 22, 2006, 21:50 EST).
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on the ground that no "reasonable jury could find for" 21 the plaintiff,
we have violated the constitutional decree that "[i]n suits at common
law,.., the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. '22 Thomas notes
that the Supreme Court has always interpreted the Seventh Amend-
ment to mean that the jury trial right must never be limited further
than it was at common law in 1791 (otherwise it would not be fully
"preserved"), and she explains that neither summary judgment nor its
equivalent existed at common law.23
Thomas's paper deserves the attention it has received, and its ar-
guments are convincing with respect to history and textual interpreta-
tion. I doubt that anyone will mount a successful rebuttal to those
points. Nonetheless, I doubt even more strongly that Thomas's histor-
ical and interpretive arguments alone will persuade courts to abolish
summary judgment. As the last half century of legal scholarship has
demonstrated, courts temper their adherence to doctrine with a
healthy dose of concern for the practical implications of their deci-
sions. Because summary judgment is such an integral part of the eve-
ryday workings of the U.S. civil justice system, and because everyone
assumes that the system would be crushed under the weight of innu-
merable trials if summary judgment disappeared, courts will turn a
blind eye to the interpretive problems raised by Thomas and by the
litigants who will cite her work. 24
I view this near-certain outcome as unfortunate-not because I
believe that courts should ignore practical considerations, but rather
because I think their assumptions about such considerations are inac-
curate in this context. Specifically, I think that the civil justice system
would actually enjoy a net benefit from abolishing summary judg-
ment, in terms of both efficiency 25 and fairness.2 6 To put it another
way, it would behoove us to abolish summary judgment even if we were
not constitutionally obligated to do so. My hope is that the twin
problems of its unconstitutionality and its concrete harm might to-
gether be enough to persuade courts (or amenders of the Federal
21 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); BRUNET ET AL., supra note
11, at 267. This is the standard set out by the Supreme Court for whether summary judgment
should be granted, and it governs current practice.
22 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
23 See Thomas, supra note 19, at 148-58 (outlining the procedural mechanisms available at
common law and concluding that summary judgment does not resemble those procedures).
24 To her credit, Thomas anticipates this point and addresses it in a couple of paragraphs
near the end of her paper. See Thomas, supra note 19, at 177-79.
25 Infra Part I.C.
26 Infra Part II.A.
[Vol. 75:522
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Rules of Civil Procedure) to move away from this practice rather than
embrace it. We would be better off if we returned to the old para-
digms of settlement and trial than if we maintained our current reli-
ance on pretrial adjudication as the new dominant mode of resolving
disputes.
I. The Monetary Cost of Summary Judgment
A. Litigation in a System with Summary Judgment
The single most important reason that courts and scholars will
resist abolishing summary judgment is their assumption that without
it, too many cases will go to trial.27 But as we will see, this assumption
ignores the main way in which summary judgment is currently used.
Plaintiffs, defendants, and lawsuits come in many different shapes
and sizes, but in today's American civil justice system, perhaps the
most typical defendant is a large corporation that is sued often by con-
sumers, employees, shareholders, other corporations, or all of the
above. Knowing that it must defend many lawsuits, the corporation
seeks to minimize the two types of costs those suits create: attorneys'
fees28 and payouts to plaintiffs.
The most effective way to reduce attorneys' fees is to settle imme-
diately, once the lawsuit is filed.29 All else being equal, this would be
the most appealing choice because it ends the litigation before lawyers
start charging hefty hourly fees for discovery and other pretrial work
that can take a very long time to complete. Saving these attorneys'
fees is a crucial motivator for a corporate defendant.
But it can conflict with the other main motivator: avoiding large
payouts to plaintiffs. Although early settlements help defendants
avoid the worst-case scenario-an adverse jury verdict and accompa-
nying huge assessment of damages-they also create two problems.
First, they foreclose the best-case scenario of paying no money at all
to the plaintiff; such a result could be reached only by a favorable
judgment.30 Second, settlement encourages other plaintiffs to bring
lawsuits (and can even encourage the same plaintiff to bring new law-
27 BRUNET ET AL., supra note 11, at 327.
28 Stephen M. Bundy, Comment, Commentary on "Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco":
Rational Bargaining and Agency Problems, 75 VA. L. REV. 335, 346 (1989) ("In ordinary civil
cases, the principal litigation cost is attorneys' fees .... ").
29 Loewenstein et al., supra note 4, at 135.
30 Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 14, at 107 ("[Tjhe major benefit of summary
judgment to the defendant is the possibility that she will prevail on the motion.").
2007]
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suits with different claims), thereby multiplying the defendant's total
costs of paying those who sue the corporation. 31
What looms largest in this calculus is the ever-present awareness
of the worst-case scenario: a jury verdict and "nuclear" award of dam-
ages to the plaintiff.32 Although early settlements can encourage
some copycat lawsuits, nothing attracts the attention of plaintiffs' at-
torneys and would-be litigants like a large judgment. 33 In addition,
such a judgment (which, unlike the terms of a settlement, is always
public) can diminish the confidence of consumers and investors,
thereby costing the company in ways that go beyond the assessed
damages.34 Most of all, those damages themselves can be staggering,
sometimes reaching well into the hundreds of millions or even billions
of dollars. 35
So the challenge for a defendant is to avoid at all costs the worst-
case scenario while trying to walk the line between minimizing attor-
neys' fees and minimizing settlement payouts. In some cases, these
goals are best achieved by early settlement. But in an increasingly
large number of cases, defendants are choosing a different option.
They litigate the case to summary judgment, hoping to win at that
31 Lee W. Rawles, Note, The California Vexatious Litigant Statute: A Viable Judicial Tool
to Deny the Clever Obstructionists Access?, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 275, 282-83 (1998) ("Often de-
fendants in arguably frivolous suits choose to settle rather than expend large sums of money
defending the suit. This, in turn, creates incentives for frivolous litigation, particularly for those
who have previously received similar nuisance payments." (footnotes omitted)); cf. Frank B.
Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8 (2000) ("If the defendant calcu-
lates accurately, and wins the first case, it will suffer fewer future claims and have a better chance
of winning those claims that plaintiffs do bring.").
32 See JOINT ECON. COMM., 105TH CONG., AUTO CHOICE: RELIEF FOR BUSINESSES AND
CONSUMERS 5 (Comm. Print 1998), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/tort/relief/relief.pdf
("Business defendants.., suffer from a 'deep pockets' syndrome that makes it more likely they
will get hit with a large damage award."). Of course, many cases involve small claims and thus
create no threat of a large payout. I am referring in the text to the cases that are of most
significance in terms of the amount at stake and how protracted and expensive the litigation is
likely to be.
33 See Erik K. Moller et al., Punitive Damages in Financial Injury Jury Verdicts, 28 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 283, 286 (1999) ("[J]uries determine whether the plaintiff wins and, if so, how much
the plaintiff will be awarded, thus establishing guidelines that will be used to value future
disputes.").
34 Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 571 (1991) ("[Businesses] also pay indirectly, through increased
insurance premiums; indirect business costs of pending litigation such as the time of managers
and employees who must participate in the litigation; reputational harm among customers, sup-
pliers and distributors; the effects of reporting a large contingent liability in the company's finan-
cial statements on the company's stock price and its ability to obtain additional financing; and
practical restrictions on the company's business options .... ).
35 E.g., Pennzoil, Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 729 S.w.2d 768, 784 (Tex. App. 1987) ($10.53 billion).
[Vol. 75:522
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stage and avoid any payout to the plaintiff. A grant of summary judg-
ment would also have the advantage of deterring future lawsuits be-
cause plaintiffs (or their lawyers, who sometimes receive a contingent
fee and are thus the real entrepreneurs who drive the litigation)36
would have to pay the costs of discovery to oppose the motion for
summary judgment but would receive no award of damages. 37 The
case would be a severe money-loser for the plaintiff, and future liti-
gants and their lawyers would take note.
In many cases, the court grants the motion for summary judg-
ment.38 But perhaps the most important feature of this litigation strat-
egy is what happens when that motion is denied. Typically, the
defendant settles the case immediately. 39 This stands to reason be-
cause litigating after a denial of summary judgment costs money (at-
torneys' fees) and risks the nightmare outcome of an adverse
judgment.40
36 See John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1419, 1450 (2003) ("[Pilaintiffs' lawyers, engaged on a contingent basis, would invest their time
and cover the ongoing costs of discovery and trial only if they had a reasonable chance to win.").
37 See Cross, supra note 31, at 1 ("[Rlepeat player litigants, particularly tort and product
liability defendants, have a strong economic interest to engage in strategic precedent setting and
reduce their potential liability in future cases.").
38 Rave, supra note 10, at 901 ("From the empirical data, it appears that the success rate
for summary judgment motions (resulting in terminations) in the years since the Trilogy varies
from a low of roughly 20% to a high around 40%."); see also infra Part II.A (discussing the
judicial bias in favor of defendants at the summary judgment stage).
39 See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 11, at 325-26 ("[T]he denial of a defendant's motion for
summary judgment may give the defendant an incentive to make a reasonable settlement offer,
rather than face the risk and expense of going to trial. By contrast, as long as the motion is still
pending, the party who has filed the motion may be unwilling to engage in realistic settlement
discussions."); Carrie E. Johnson, Comment, Rocket Dockets: Reducing Delay in Federal Civil
Litigation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 225, 241 (1997) ("When trial is a legitimate and immediate threat, it
influences the substance and tenor of settlement discussions: a quickly approaching trial date
encourages parties to participate realistically and cooperatively in settlement efforts.").
40 Although the possibility remains for judgment as a matter of law at the end of the
plaintiff's case-in-chief, see FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1), summary judgment and judgment as a mat-
ter of law now share the same standard in the post-trilogy world, making this possibility unlikely.
Robert J. Gregory, One Too Many Rivers to Cross: Rule 50 Practice in the Modern Era of Sum-
mary Judgment, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 689, 704-05 (1996). See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, A
Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Ver-
dict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 149 (1988) ("'When there is an issue
whether the testimony of an affiant or deponent would be credible if presented at trial, the court
must deny summary judgment .... However, a directed verdict motion typically would be made
after the witness had testified and the court could take account of the possibility that he either
could not be disbelieved or believed by the jury."' (quoting 10 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, AR-
THUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2713.1 (2d ed.
1983))).
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A typical litigation strategy is thus for a defendant to go through
discovery in the hope of winning at the summary judgment phase,
then to settle immediately if summary judgment is not granted. Ap-
preciating this strategy is essential to debunking the pervasive assump-
tion about what would happen in the absence of summary judgment,
namely, that most of these cases would go to trial.
B. Litigation in a System Without Summary Judgment
In the current system, there are three main stages at which a law-
suit can be resolved. First, it can be settled immediately after it is
filed. Second, it can be resolved just after the filing of a summary
judgment motion, either by the court's decision to grant the motion
(thereby ending the case) or by the parties' choice to settle after the
court has denied the motion. Third, it can be resolved by the verdict of
a jury or judge upon completion of a full trial.
Of course, this is an oversimplification. A case can end at any
time between its original filing and the ruling in the last available ap-
peal or collateral attack. The plaintiff can drop the case, or the parties
can settle, whenever they choose. But the three stages described in
the previous paragraph are nonetheless useful because they identify
common times in which cases are resolved and therefore allow us to
analyze, however broadly, the likely effects of changing the system.
Specifically, the current system looks like this:
Time One Time Two Time Three
Early Settlement Summary Judgment Adjudication
or Settlement at Trial
If we eliminated summary judgment, this picture would change
dramatically: Time Two would disappear. 41 The clear (but widely un-
derappreciated)42 result of that disappearance is as follows. The many
cases that currently are resolved at Time Two would not all become
41 See Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 14, at 97 ("In the absence of a summary
judgment procedure, a legal dispute can be conceptualized as a two-stage process consisting of
negotiations during the pretrial phase of the case, followed by trial if negotiations fail to result in
a settlement.").
42 The article by Issacharoff and Loewenstein, supra note 14, is a noteworthy exception.
Published seventeen years ago, just after the Supreme Court's trilogy of cases expanding sum-
mary judgment, it used economic analysis to anticipate the possibility that summary judgment
could divert cases away from settlement. Id. at 100-03 ("lit is not at all clear that the expansion
of summary judgment yields the intended consequence of decreasing the likelihood of trial. Fur-
thermore, the expansion of summary judgment will likely increase aggregate legal expenditures,
thus producing a corresponding deadweight loss to society."); see also Stempel, supra note 40, at
[Vol. 75:522
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Time Three cases; instead, a large majority would almost certainly be-
come Time One cases.
Summary judgment gives a defendant a "free" opportunity to re-
ceive a favorable adjudication. 43 The opportunity is certainly not
costless-attorneys' fees for litigating through discovery to summary
judgment are high-but it is free of the realistic possibility of losing
the case. For whatever reason (one possibility is the fact that a plain-
tiff must prove her case by a preponderance of the evidence), judges
routinely grant summary judgment motions for defendants but not for
plaintiffs. 4 Defendants accordingly view summary judgment as an op-
portunity to win without the risk of losing.
Whereas it is tempting to avail oneself of such an opportunity, a
trial does not hold the same allure. Unlike summary judgment, adju-
dication at trial can and does routinely result in judgments for the
plaintiff, accompanied by crippling awards of damages.45 The fact that
a defendant chose to litigate a case through summary judgment rather
than settle immediately does not indicate that the defendant would
have litigated through trial rather than settle immediately if summary
judgment were not available.
In fact, we should expect just the opposite. The dominant theme
of civil procedure scholarship over the past twenty-five years has been
how rare trials have become.46 This theme has only intensified re-
cently with the new focus on summary judgment and other pretrial
adjudication, highlighted by the recent initiative of the American Bar
Association to study "The Vanishing Trial. '47 A central reason that
trials are so rare is that defendants avoid them like the plague, steer-
ing away from the risks associated with a jury verdict. There is no
reason to believe that this decisive aversion to trials-the aversion
that drives our current system of dispute resolution and has done so
for at least two decades-would abate in a world without summary
170-73. Now that summary judgment has moved to center stage in our judicial system, heeding
these authors' early warnings carries even more urgency.
43 See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 11, at 325 ("[D]efendants with greater resources fre-
quently feel that they have little to lose by the filing of such a motion.").
44 Catherine Albiston, The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The Paradox of Losing
by Winning, 33 LAw & Soc'v REv. 869, 882 (1999) ("It is much more difficult for a plaintiff than
a defendant to obtain summary judgment... because the plaintiff generally bears the burden of
proof."); see also supra note 10 (citing statistics).
45 See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
46 See generally, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).
47 See Patricia Lee Refo, Opening Statement: The Vanishing Trial, LITIG., Winter 2004, at 1,
20071
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judgment. On the contrary, it would steer cases toward early
settlement.48
More needs to be said in defense of this proposition, but first a
brief detour is necessary to consider the extent to which the proposi-
tion matters if it is true. The next section accordingly explores what
the costs would be of switching from a three-part system (1. early set-
tlement; 2. summary judgment; and 3. trial) to a two-part system (1.
early settlement and 2. trial)-i.e., whether the costs of even a few
more trials might outweigh the benefits of steering most cases toward
early settlement. After that, I will return in Part I.D to the question of
whether I have fairly expressed the likely outcome of eliminating sum-
mary judgment. Do we have good enough reason to believe that the
cases currently resolved by summary judgment (or by a settlement im-
mediately after a denial of summary judgment) would settle early
rather than go to trial if summary judgment were unavailable?
C. Comparing Costs
When people assume that the sky would fall without summary
judgment, they base that assumption on two questionable premises.
The first, discussed above, is that the lawsuits currently resolved by
summary judgment would instead be resolved by trial.49 I have sug-
gested that most of those lawsuits would actually be resolved by early
settlement, and I will further explore that claim in the next section in
light of some likely objections. Before doing so, it is useful to mention
and evaluate the second premise that makes people so attached to
summary judgment. It is that trials are prohibitively expensive,
whereas summary judgment is comparatively cheap.
Once again, it helps to look at the three main stages at which
lawsuits are currently resolved:
Time One Time Two Time Three
Early Settlement Summary Judgment Adjudication
or Settlement at Trial
48 See Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 14, at 100-03 (discussing the optimal condi-
tions for settlement and finding that summary judgment likely hinders settlement efforts by al-
tering the parties' incentives to settle at different stages of litigation); Morton Denlow, Summary
Judgment: Boon or Burden?, 37 JUDGES' J., Summer 1998, at 26, 26 ("Summary judgment mo-
tions are excessively used and delay resolution of cases that would otherwise be tried or
settled.").
49 E.g., Gary T. Foremaster, The Movant's Burden in a Motion for Summary Judgment,
1987 UTAH L. REV. 731, 734 ("Summary judgment, therefore, alleviates the waste of time, the
expense, and the burden of needless trials.").
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Without summary judgment, we would be left only with Time
One and Time Three; 50 the cases in Time Two would migrate into
those other categories. If the prevailing assumption were correct,
then summary judgment might save money in the aggregate even if
most cases that currently are resolved at Time Two would instead be
resolved at Time One. So long as some cases end up in Time Three,
the cost of those new trials could theoretically outweigh the savings
from the cases that move from Time Two to Time One.
That view has it backwards. In fact, there is good reason to be-
lieve that in most cases the cost of litigating to summary judgment ex-
ceeds the cost of settling early by a greater amount than the cost of trial
exceeds the cost of litigating to summary judgment. In other words,
summary judgment is more expensive than trial. This statement lends
itself to a misunderstanding, so it needs a bit of explanation. In the
current system, a case that goes all the way to the end of a trial has
necessarily gone through the phases of discovery and pretrial motions
that lead to summary judgment. So a lawsuit litigated fully through
trial includes the summary judgment stage and cannot logically be less
expensive than if it had ended at summary judgment. When I say that
trials are less expensive than summary judgments, what I mean is the
wordy statement italicized earlier in this paragraph. When a case goes
all the way through trial, the part of the litigation conducted after
summary judgment (i.e., the trial) often costs less than the part con-
ducted before summary judgment (i.e., discovery and pretrial mo-
tions).51 Summary judgment is much more expensive than people
think, and trial is much less expensive, because the main expense of
litigating all the way to the end of a trial is incurred before the trial
begins.
Like surgery, litigation costs a lot because it can be done only by
professional specialists who charge high fees. Parties pay lawyers hun-
dreds of dollars per hour,52 so litigation costs depend primarily on how
50 As noted earlier, this is an oversimplification. Some cases surely would settle after par-
tial discovery had been conducted, arguably creating a new sort of "Time Two." But in my view
it is naive to think that in the current system, the reason that cases routinely settle immediately
after summary judgment is denied is simply that this happens to be the time that sufficient dis-
covery has been conducted to inform the parties that they want to settle. Instead, they settle
then for the same reason that they settle early in any phase of litigation: to minimize lawyers'
fees.
51 David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72, 104
(1983).
52 Of course, some lawyers are paid by the project, or on a contingency basis (typically
plaintiffs' lawyers in certain areas of specialization such as personal injury cases, malpractice
cases, and class actions). But such fee arrangements are the exception rather than the rule.
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many hours the parties' lawyers must devote to the case. How are
these hours spent? As first-year associates at large law firms know all
too well, much of the time is devoted to reviewing the documents that
must be produced for discovery. This task is often extremely onerous,
as a defendant corporation typically keeps mountains of records that
were not organized with litigation in mind. 53 Sifting through these
records to find and duplicate only, and all, the materials that must be
turned over to the plaintiff, takes time. And the clich6 that "time is
money" has never been more true.
The cost does not end with document review. All parties must be
questioned, through depositions or interrogatories or, most often,
both. Lawyers first send interrogatories (lists of written questions) to
each party. When the questions are received, the lawyers for the
other side draft answers with the help of the client. Drafting every
interrogatory and every answer for each party in the lawsuit consumes
plenty of billable hours.54
But it still does not consume as many hours as does the other,
more important form of questioning: live depositions. Here, lawyers
are able to confront parties and witnesses face-to-face and learn how
well they are likely to perform at trial. Unlike interrogatories, deposi-
tions require witnesses to answer questions themselves, rather than
have those answers drafted by a lawyer. But these features come at a
steep price. The lawyers for both parties typically are present, along
with the deponent and a court stenographer. Everyone but the wit-
ness is being paid, and the witness is losing time from her ordinary
work. A single deposition can take days, and a complicated lawsuit
could require that scores of witnesses be deposed. 55 If any of these
53 See, e.g., Robert L. Haig & John P. Marshall, Corporate Discovery Strategy in Complex
Litigation, N.Y. ST. B.J., Oct. 1995, at 36, 36 ("Corporate litigants have particular discovery
problems and needs because many have numerous locations, large numbers of employees, and a
multitude of documents.").
54 Frequently, the interrogatories and their responses will create unnecessary cost due to
overlap. For instance, in multi-defendant litigation, each defendant will take time to draft and
send the plaintiff its own set of interrogatories. Therefore, multiple firms will often bill their
respective clients for interrogatories that have already been propounded. Similarly, when multi-
ple plaintiffs are represented by separate counsel, twice the hours will go into answering inter-
rogatories sent by each defendant.
55 Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure cap both the number of depositions
allowed, FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A), and the length of each deposition, FED. R. Civ. P.
30(d)(2), the Rules also allow litigants to stipulate to expansions, FED. R. Civ. P. 29, or move the
court to allow further discovery, FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
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witnesses are experts, then those experts too must be paid for their
time by the party employing them. 5 6
The time devoted to reviewing and producing documents, writing
questions and answers for interrogatories, and taking depositions (not
to mention the litigation costs to compel noncompliant parties or wit-
nesses) 57 is far from the entirety of pretrial costs. A major additional
cost is simply the preparation for discovery. In order to know which
questions to ask, which answers to give, and which documents to re-
quest or divulge, the lawyers for each party must investigate the case
and form a litigation strategy. Merely learning the relevant informa-
tion can require considerable effort.
In addition, every court-related document imposes a cost. This
begins with the service of process and the complaint, and it continues
with the answer, the discovery requests, the motions to dismiss, and
the motion for summary judgment. Drafting these motions and the
responses to them is a crucial part of the lawyers' work. In particular,
the court's ruling on the summary judgment motion ordinarily deter-
mines whether the defendant will win the case outright or will instead
have to pay a hefty settlement amount to the plaintiff.58 As a result,
parties are willing to pay lawyers to spend massive numbers of hours
drafting and revising these long, detailed motions on which the out-
come of the litigation turns.59
Because the motion for summary judgment is so important, it also
imposes a substantial time cost on the court. 60 The court must review
all the accumulated evidence and render the central decision of the
case. This comes after the court has reviewed and ruled on all earlier
motions, including the motions to dismiss. Judges are not paid by the
hour, but the time they spend on these decisions pushes back their
56 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-109(C)(3) (1983).
57 Stephen D. Easton, My Last Lecture: Unsolicited Advice for Future and Current Law-
yers, 56 S.C. L. REV. 229, 240-41 (2004) ("Many civil litigators spend most or all of their time
drafting discovery requests, compiling and reviewing documents and data to respond to discov-
ery requests, drafting discovery responses, filing motions for protective orders regarding discov-
ery or motions to compel discovery, responding to these motions, and otherwise fighting over
discovery issues.").
58 See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 11, at 325-26.
59 Denlow, supra note 48, at 29 ("Summary judgment motions and their supporting papers
can cost over $10,000 per side to prepare.").
60 Stempel, supra note 40, at 171 ("The judge deciding a summary judgment question must
along with her law clerks read, research, reflect, hold a hearing, read and research some more,
and often must draft, revise, and issue a lengthy written opinion as well. Although presiding over
a jury trial takes time, it may not take any more of the judge's time than does consideration of
the summary judgment motion.").
20071
HeinOnline  -- 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 535 2006-2007
The George Washington Law Review
dockets, delaying the administration of justice in other cases.61 Such
delay imposes costs on the parties in those other cases and arguably
erodes confidence in the civil justice system by contributing to the im-
pression that it moves too slowly and inefficiently to serve its purposes
well.6
2
All of these pretrial activities combine to form the largest piece of
the litigation pie, both in terms of overall cost and overall time.63 The
rare civil lawsuit that actually goes to trial has surprisingly little left to
it after the summary judgment motion has been denied. 64 Virtually all
that remains is to repeat the highlights of the deposition questioning
in open court, with occasional evidentiary objections thrown in. To be
sure, there are other matters unique to trial: opening and closing state-
ments, jury selection, and jury deliberation. But these procedures
pale in comparison to the time and money consumed by pretrial
work.65
The view that trials cost relatively little is supported by the admit-
tedly very limited empirical work that has been done on the subject.
In 1983, David Trubek and others published a study indicating that in
typical cases that went to trial, more than ninety percent of the law-
yers' time was spent on pretrial work.66 And in the spring of 2006, a
Note in the New York University Law Review concluded that "for
summary judgment to be clearly efficient, the cost of the motion to the
plaintiff would have to be less than one-quarter the cost of trial, and
for the defendant, less than one-eighth the cost of trial. '67 At the very
least, these studies run against the grain of the widely held perception
that abolishing summary judgment is unthinkable due to the costs that
the practice is thought to save.
D. Do Defendants Pursue Summary Judgment Primarily when
They Otherwise Would Have Gone to Trial?
Because I emphasized so strongly above that many cases resolved
by summary judgment would be settled early in a world without sum-
61 Denlow, supra note 48, at 27-28 ("Overuse of the summary judgment motion results in
a backlog of such motions in already busy courtrooms.").
62 See id. (discussing how the overuse of summary judgment motions leads to dissatisfac-
tion with the legal system); cf. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Norman Page ed., Penguin
Books 1971) (1853).
63 Trubek et al., supra note 51, at 104.
64 Id. at 89, 104 (finding that the ordinary case required on average only 6.7 hours for trial
out of an average 72.9 total hours).
65 Id. at 104.
66 Id. at 91.
67 Rave, supra note 10, at 908-09.
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mary judgment, it is important now to explore that contention more
fully. The question a skeptic will pose is why these cases will settle
early rather than go to trial.
My main answer has been that the fear of a jury verdict and the
costs of litigation would discourage parties from proceeding toward
adjudication if summary judgment were not an option. But the skep-
tic might try to tell the following sort of story. Perhaps defendants in
the current civil justice system settle early when they expect to lose at
summary judgment but pursue pretrial adjudication when they expect
to win. If summary judgment were no more, these defendants would
take the money they now pay for pretrial litigation and devote it to
pursuing a favorable jury verdict. They would have little to fear be-
cause their cases are strong; the weak cases would settle early with or
without summary judgment. Or so the argument would go.
If this argument were true, then summary judgment might save
money because its sole use would be to cut short those lawsuits that
would otherwise have gone to trial. But there are at least two reasons
to mistrust this line of reasoning.
First, if the argument were true, we would expect summary judg-
ment to be granted in an exceedingly high percentage of cases in
which it is sought. After all, the premise is that defendants seek sum-
mary judgment only when they are so confident of success that they
are willing to pay the high costs of litigation to secure it.68 But in fact
only twenty to forty percent of summary judgment motions are
granted. 69 And this is so even after the Supreme Court issued its fa-
mous trilogy of opinions encouraging judges to grant such motions far
more freely. 70 That percentage also includes the likely judicial bias,
discussed later in this Article, in favor of granting such motions. 7t
Second, if the cases that now go to summary judgment would in-
stead go to trial were summary judgment not available, then we would
expect those cases to go to trial in the current system after summary
judgment is denied. But instead, the typical practice is to settle imme-
diately after the bid for pretrial adjudication fails.72 This practice
strongly suggests that defendants who are eager to litigate to summary
68 BRUNET ET AL., supra note 11, at 324 ("Although the goal of summary judgment proce-
dure is to save the time, effort, expense, and the risk of a trial, at times the filing of such a motion
can dramatically increase the costs of litigation while at the same time substantially delaying the
case's ultimate resolution.").
69 See supra note 38.
70 See supra note 13.
71 See infra Part H.A.
72 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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judgment are unwilling to litigate those same lawsuits to trial. In a sys-
tem without summary judgment, they would thus be inclined to settle
early because trial would be the only alternative.
Defendants' usual behavior suggests that when they seek sum-
mary judgment, they do so either because they view it as an opportu-
nity to win without the risk of losing (unlike a trial) or because they
believe they have a better chance to win at summary judgment than at
trial. 73 Either explanation is deeply troubling. There is no reason that
defendants should be privileged with a device that gives them two
chances to win every lawsuit, whereas plaintiffs realistically have only
one chance. 74 Moreover, if it is true that a defendant has a better
chance to win at summary judgment than at trial, then that bespeaks a
severe flaw in our civil justice system because summary judgment by
its nature should be granted only if a party is certain to win at trial. 75
The purpose of summary judgment is certainly not to reach a different
outcome from the one that would be reached at trial, but rather to
avoid the cost of trial when the outcome is not in doubt.76
There are thus reasons to believe that defendants seek summary
judgment because, at least in some cases, they believe courts will grant
it even if a jury might well have ruled for the plaintiff at trial.77 This
practice conflicts not only with the rationale behind summary judg-
ment, but also with the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Some observers might nonetheless wonder whether the practice, how-
ever legally illegitimate, could be beneficial in that judges might be
better decision makers than juries. There is a rich literature on this
question and no need to rehearse the well-known arguments here.78
But in the context of summary judgment, I see a particularly strong
reason to doubt the superiority of judges, and it is to that subject I will
now turn.
73 BRUNET ET AL., supra note 11, at 325.
74 Denlow, supra note 48, at 27 ("Although a plaintiff has equal recourse to summary
judgment under Rule 56, the motion has largely become a defendant's weapon."); see also supra
note 10 (citing data indicating that summary judgment motions are granted for defendants at a
higher rate than for plaintiffs).
75 See Easton, supra note 57, at 247 ("If the system is working properly and the evidence is
against you, you generally should lose, despite your best efforts.").
76 BRUNET ET AL., supra note 11, at 1.
77 Indeed, one practitioner's guide even instructs attorneys to "seriously consider filing a
summary judgment motion where the equities of the case are clearly against the client's position
but there is a chance to win the case on the law." Id. at 332.
78 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 816-21 (2001); Landsman, supra note 1, at 288-89; Miller, supra
note 14, at 1094-126.
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II. Nonmonetary Effects of Abolishing Summary Judgment
This Article is motivated primarily by my belief that people gen-
erally overestimate the cost of abolishing summary judgment. But the
harm caused by pretrial adjudication is not measurable in dollars
alone.79 Summary judgment reduces the fairness of the civil justice
system, and its abolition would level the playing field in accordance
with the principles the system aims to serve.
A. Reducing Pro-Defendant Bias
In theory, a judge will grant a motion for summary judgment only
when no reasonable jury could reach the opposite result at trial. But
as everyone understands, theory is different from practice. Any sys-
tem run by human beings will have variations between different deci-
sion makers' interpretations of the same rule, not to mention simple
errors made by those decision makers. 80 We strive to reduce these
errors while understanding that perfection is unattainable.
It would therefore be a relatively minor complaint to say that
judges sometimes grant summary judgment motions even if the out-
come at trial might have been different. Judges, like the rest of us, are
susceptible to making mistakes in all parts of their work. My concern
is not with judicial fallibility. Instead, I think that summary judgment
inherently causes judges to skew their judgments in a predictable
pattern.
In my previous work, I have explored the phenomenon of settle-
ment in class actions, a category of civil cases that has received special
attention from the legal academy due to the importance of those cases
and the challenges they pose for guaranteeing procedural rights to ab-
sent class members. 81 Although there is much disagreement about
how to craft an optimal system for handling class litigation, what is not
in dispute is that the current system is failing.82 Chief among its
problems is that the lawyer who represents the plaintiff class often
79 Cf Richard L. Barnes, The Efficiency Justification for Secured Transactions: Foxes and
Soxes and Other Fanciful Stuff, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 13, 15 (1993) ("In systemic efficiency all
participants must experience a gain either through cost savings or increases in satisfaction.").
80 See Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 3 (1994) ("[A]II judges, as
a part of basic human functioning, bring to each decision a package of personal biases and beliefs
that may unconsciously and unintentionally affect the decisionmaking process.").
81 John Bronsteen, Class Action Settlements: An Opt-In Proposal, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV.
903; Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 36.
82 Douglas C. Nelson, Consumer News, 17 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 121, 125 (2004)
("[D]espite the class action lawsuit's noble purpose and undeniable success in many instances,
arguably, no component of our legal system is more susceptible to abuse.").
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colludes with the defendant to structure a settlement that pays the
lawyer a lot but his clients (the class members) very little.8 3 Because
every class action settlement must be approved by a judge, much ink
has been spilled trying to explain why judges routinely accept agree-
ments that are, on their face, products of collusive dealing.84 Why do
judges abdicate their responsibility to police these deals?
A few factors are probably involved, 85 but many believe that the
main one is as follows: if a judge rejects a class action settlement, then
the case may go to trial, and judges desperately want to avoid trials.
This is a poorly kept secret among judges and their law clerks, and
sometimes it even spills out into public statements like this one, ut-
tered by a judge as an explanation for why he opposed reforms that
would have combated collusive class settlements: "'From the court's
perspective, it would be terrible if a case went to trial because a settle-
ment option is not available.' "86
Why do judges dislike trials? The reason is that trials impose two
things on judges that most people find unpleasant-extra work and
social disapprobation.8 7 A case that settles is gone forever, but a case
that goes to trial drags on and requires the judge's constant attention.
The judge is effectively chained to the bench, listening to testimony,
ruling on objections, and shepherding the case along from jury selec-
tion through the verdict. As this takes place, more and more cases
pile up on the judge's docket-cases to which the judge cannot fully
attend until the trial ends. 88 And while these cases are piling up, other
cases must be diverted by the judicial system's administrative staff to
83 Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 805, 821 (1997) ("In
fact, there is no better formula for collusion than a situation in which the rights of non-partici-
pants can be extinguished without notice or an opportunity to get out from under a prospective
court decree.").
84 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 375 (2000).
85 Some of these factors are as follows: (1) the dearth of legitimate class settlements to
which a judge can compare a presented settlement, Bronsteen, supra note 81, at 916; (2) the
absence of an adversarial process at the settlement stage, id. at 916-17; (3) insufficient discovery
when cases settle early, id. at 927; and (4) the sense of a lower threshold of judicial responsibility
for policing settlements than for rendering judgments, id. at 923-27.
86 Class Action Lawyers Doubt Provisions in Legislation Aimed at Curbing Abuses, 72
U.S.L.W. 2593 (Apr. 6, 2004) (quoting Judge Frederick Motz of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland), available at http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/law2.nsf/is/a0a8h2k7f7.
87 Bronsteen, supra note 81, at 915.
88 See Resnik, supra note 2, at 421 ("If cases are disposed of quickly, the time saved can be
used to consider more cases.").
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other judges whose dockets are less crowded, thereby imposing work
on those other judges.89
A judge who is constantly in trial will suffer a double hardship:
she will work more than other judges while simultaneously drawing
their ire for diverting other cases to them and thus forcing them to
work more as well.90 She will also risk ridicule from politicians and
commentators who, often made aware of the issue by those who stand
to gain by avoiding trials,91 emphasize the backlog of cases in the judi-
cial system and accuse judges with large backlogs of corrupting the
system.
In addition to these personal considerations, a judge who avoids
trials might view herself as doing a service to the litigants whose cases
are slated later in the docket.92 By moving the docket along, the judge
gives those litigants their day in court sooner and in that respect im-
proves the administration of justice with respect to them.93 There is
no doubt that a faster justice system is of great value, all else being
equal.94 But there is also no doubt that all else is not equal. To move
their dockets along and achieve all of the benefits (personal and oth-
erwise) that come with doing so, judges engage in several practices
that directly undermine the fairness of our court system.95 They ap-
prove manifestly unfair settlements in class action litigation. 96 They
89 See id. at 404.
90 Id. ("When judges who dispose of many cases lecture other judges on how to reduce
backlogs, peer pressure tends to generate more vigorous management.").
91 I have in mind large corporations who are constantly defendants in litigation, although
less scrupulous members of the class action plaintiffs' bar could also fit into this category.
92 See Resnik, supra note 2, at 404 ("[Jludges may believe that their intervention speeds
settlement and improves the litigation process.").
93 Martin B. Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation: A Golden Anniver-
sary View of Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1023, 1042 (1989) ("[S]ummary judgment motions have been
granted much more readily, even in areas once regarded almost as taboo and often to an accom-
paniment of judicial rhetoric suddenly responsive to the need for more effective interception.").
94 See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), in
A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 289, 292
(James Washington ed., 1986) ("[J]ustice too long delayed is justice denied.").
95 In the words of one judge,
I think in the 20 years since I was a district court judge, we've seen a tremendous
increase in volume, tremendous pressure to decide cases without thinking very
much about them, tremendous pressures to avoid deciding cases. I mean, some
judges will do almost anything to avoid deciding a case on the merits and find some
procedural reason to get rid of it, coerce the parties into settling or whatever it
might be.
Richard Arnold, Mr. Justice Brennan and the Little Case, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 663, 670 (1999).
96 See Bronsteen, supra note 81, at 905-06.
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browbeat parties into settling cases, sometimes using threats to dis-
courage a litigant from availing herself of her right to go to trial.97
And they grant defendants' motions for summary judgment in cases
that juries might have resolved in favor of the plaintiffs.98
In this way, summary judgment creates an incentive for judges to
act unfairly.99 When a judge grants a motion for summary judgment,
the case goes away; whereas when a judge denies such a motion, a trial
remains possible. The parties might instead settle, but there is no
guarantee. So every time a judge adjudicates at the summary judg-
ment stage, there is a thumb on the scale in favor of the defendant.
My claim is not, of course, that judges will always give in to the
temptation to grant summary judgment. Some judges might not even
be conscious of the influence that docket pressure exerts on their deci-
sion making. 1°° But because this pressure is found in every case in
which a motion for summary judgment is filed, it stands to reason that
across the full landscape of cases, at least some will be affected. 10 1
This phenomenon differs meaningfully from ordinary judicial er-
ror. It is a systemic bias in favor of defendants, caused by the mere
existence of one of the central procedural devices in our system-
summary judgment. That is, summary judgment prevents plaintiffs
from being treated fairly by the judicial system because it biases
judges against them. Arguably the most important element of due
97 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 505 ("Settlements can be coerced, either by the
power of the parties, by a strong judge in a settlement conference, or by inexorable trial dates.");
Jonathan T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in Civil Procedure, 84
VA. L. REV. 955, 1003-04 (1998) ("Many trial judges have transformed their role from that of a
passive arbiter resolving legal disputes based on legal principle into that of an active case man-
ager who influences outcomes by controlling discovery and participating in settlement confer-
ences."); Resnik, supra note 2, at 379 ("[B]ecause of increasing case loads .... judges have begun
to experiment with schemes for speeding the resolution of cases and for persuading litigants to
settle rather than try cases whenever possible.").
98 See Mollica, supra note 15, at 180 (noting that a reversal rate of over one-third of the
sampled summary judgment dispositions "should humble anyone who believes that district court
judges can routinely pick out the cases worthy of trial or deserving of summary judgment").
Indeed, judges have been emboldened to combine these docket-clearing procedures. BRUNET
ET AL., supra note 11, at 47 ("The 1993 amendment to Rule 16 makes explicit the relationship
between Rule 56 and the pretrial conference.").
99 See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 257-58
(2004).
100 Nugent, supra note 80, at 49 ("[M]any judges are slow to accept the possibility of bias in
their own decisionmaking, viewing the existence of partiality as improbable instead of as an
inherent aspect of the human perceptual process.").
101 Lisa C. Foster, Note, Section 1447(e)'s Discretionary Joinder and Remand: Speedy Justice
or Docket Clearing?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 118, 148 n.171 ("[I]t must be recognized that docket over-
crowding may be an inevitable aspect of court decisionmaking.").
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process is an impartial decision maker, so anything that makes it more
difficult for judges to be disinterested should be subjected to thorough
scrutiny. Many judges surely are able to adjudicate fairly despite the
pressures they face, but it would be naive to assume that those pres-
sures never affect any judge's decisions. 10 2
Perhaps some pressures and their attendant biases are inevitable.
But if a procedure skews the system in favor of one class of litigants
and against another, that procedure would presumably need to be ab-
solutely necessary (or at least enormously valuable) to justify its exis-
tence in light of the harm it causes. Summary judgment appears to
saddle the system with overall monetary costs rather than benefits, 10 3
and it is probably unconstitutional.1° When these negatives are added
to the bias it creates, it is difficult to imagine why we would want to
retain it.
B. The Counterargument: Potential Harms of Abolishing
Summary Judgment
It is not difficult to imagine why defendants would want to retain
summary judgment. It gives them a free bite at the apple (a chance to
win without the possibility of losing), creates the possibility of winning
without the costs or risks of trial, and pressures the decision maker to
rule in their favor. Any call to abolish or even restrict summary judg-
ment will meet with fierce resistance from the large corporations that
benefit so much from it. Their most likely argument will be that sum-
mary judgment saves the court system from a backbreaking increase
in trials. As explained above, I find this point unconvincing.105 A few
other potential harms, however, merit further discussion.
1. Would Motions to Dismiss Fill the Void?
Summary judgment is not the only form of pretrial adjudication.
After a lawsuit is filed but long before the summary judgment phase,
the defendant can move to dismiss the case. Rule 12(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure outlines seven grounds upon which a judge
can terminate the lawsuit before any discovery has commenced: "(1)
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction
102 Evan E. Seamone, Judicial Mindfulness, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (2002) ("Like all
human beings, judges are influenced by personal routines and behaviors that have become sec-
ond nature to them or have somehow dropped below the radar of their conscious control.").
103 See supra Part I.C.
104 Thomas, supra note 19; infra Part III.
105 See supra Part I.C.
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over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5)
insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join a party under Rule
19."-106
If summary judgment were no longer available, would judges
(hell-bent on avoiding trial) begin to grant in droves these motions for
judgment on the pleadings? The only real concern is motions for
judgment under Rule 12(b)(6), failure to state a claim upon which re-
lief can be granted, because the other grounds are self-evidently inap-
plicable most of the time. The issue is whether 12(b)(6) motions
would become the new summary judgment.
To evaluate this question, it is valuable to consider precisely what
a 12(b)(6) motion is. Unlike a motion for summary judgment, which
asks the judge to look at all of the evidence amassed by both sides via
discovery, a 12(b)(6) motion directs the judge to scrutinize only one
document-the plaintiff's complaint. 107 If the complaint alleges only
that the defendant did X, and X is not prohibited by law, then a court
will dismiss the case. 108 But if the complaint alleges illegal activity by
the defendant, the judge cannot dismiss the case because the judge has
no way of knowing whether the claims are true: only the complaint
itself can be examined at this stage.
Some might suggest that if judges are as committed to avoiding
trials and to moving along their dockets as I suggested in the previous
section, then it follows that they will stop at nothing to achieve those
aims. If they are willing to abdicate their responsibility by unfairly
granting motions for summary judgment, then there is no reason to
think they would not be willing to be equally unfair in granting mo-
tions to dismiss. But this claim makes a straw man of my argument. I
do not view judges as automatons who see every procedural device
only as a means to the end of terminating litigation and who therefore
would move, in the absence of summary judgment, seamlessly to the
next available vehicle. Nor do I see judges as callous or morally bank-
rupt shirkers who will ignore the law and dismiss case after case with-
out seeing any evidence, just to move along the docket.
106 FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b).
107 Id. ("If, on a motion... to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment .... ").
108 Rhynette N. Hurd, The Propriety of Permitting Affirmative Defenses to Be Raised by
Motions to Dismiss, 20 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 411, 447 (1990) ("Rule 12(b)(6) alerts the court
to the possibility that there is no legal basis on which to establish the plaintiffs right to
recover.").
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I see judges, rather, as ordinary human beings who want to be fair
and to do their job well, but who are also subject to the influences and
pressures that affect everyone. These pressures are often strong
enough to make a judge cajole litigants into settling, or approve a
fishy class action settlement, or grant a summary judgment motion de-
spite some doubt as to the outcome at trial. But they are not strong
enough to make judges adopt the widespread policy of dismissing
cases that obviously state a claim, in the absence of any way for the
judge to evaluate the merits of that claim.109 Such an outcome seems
to me far-fetched. And although I ordinarily do not view the appeals
process as a particularly effective tool for remedying the wrongs per-
petrated by trial judges,10 unlawful grants of 12(b)(6) motions would
be such obvious legal error as to make appellate review a meaningful
corrective and deterrent.
2. Would More Lawsuits Be Filed?
Another concern that could be raised is that abolishing summary
judgment might lead to a proliferation of lawsuits because it would
make it easier for plaintiffs to win. Without the threat of an adverse
pretrial adjudication from a judge eager to end the case, plaintiffs
could more easily get to a jury or leverage the specter of a jury trial
into a favorable settlement.' Increasing the number of lawsuits is
costly to litigants and to the court system, so it might constitute a hid-
den monetary cost of eliminating the summary judgment device.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that the claim is descrip-
tively accurate-that abolishing summary judgment would lead to an
increase in the number of lawsuits filed. We have no way of knowing
whether this would be a positive or negative development," 2 as mea-
sured either by social cost or by any other yardstick. It depends upon
whether the current number of cases filed is optimal, too small, or too
109 See Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of
Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1104 (1986) ("The motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.").
110 Bronsteen, supra note 81, at 915-16.
111 See Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 14, at 105 ("By increasing the anticipated
costs, summary judgment discourages a broad spectrum of plaintiffs from entering the litigation
arena.").
112 See, e.g., Bronsteen, supra note 81, at 920; cf. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Contracting Access to
the Courts: Myth or Reality? Boon or Bane?, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 965, 996 (1998) ("For the most
part, the changing doctrines of the last two decades and greater use of procedure as an impedi-
ment to adjudication rather than as a catalyst for adjudication, have been a wrong turn in the law
occasioned by an overwrought belief that the system demanded constraint in order to survive the
onslaught of cases and controversies.").
2007]
HeinOnline  -- 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 545 2006-2007
The George Washington Law Review
large. If the current system overly encourages lawsuits, then a further
increase in cases would impose undue cost on defendants and courts.
On the other hand, if the current system unduly discourages lawsuits,
then removing barriers to litigation is necessary to create optimal de-
terrence of illegal acts. When defendants break the law, they impose
social costs on their victims and, in turn, on the public that has
deemed adherence to this particular law to be in its interest. In many
contexts, private lawsuits are the primary means of enforcing our laws
and deterring those who stand to gain by violating them. When too
few plaintiffs sue, there is too little deterrence and therefore too much
lawbreaking.
Without knowing whether an increase in lawsuits would be good
or bad, it would be unreasonable to deem it a virtue that summary
judgment might reduce the number of cases filed. Indeed, summary
judgment appears to be a rather arbitrary advantage bestowed on the
defendant,11 3 tipping the scales for no clear reason. If summary judg-
ment were reconceptualized such that judges were just as willing to
grant it in favor of plaintiffs as they are to grant it in favor of defend-
ants, then the procedure would no longer discourage lawsuits. Such a
change could be criticized on the same ground discussed here regard-
ing abolition: it might lead to more litigation. But evening the playing
field between plaintiffs and defendants is fair on its face; it would be
problematic only if we were confident that most lawsuits lack merit.
Some people hold that opinion, but I am unaware of any objective
support for it.
3. Harm to Faultless Defendants
One last image might trouble those who are considering my plea
to abandon the practice of summary judgment. It is the image of a
defendant who did nothing wrong but who nonetheless faces repeated
and protracted litigation. The source of the litigation is a set of un-
scrupulous plaintiffs and their lawyers who are eager to soak the deep-
pocketed defendant for a settlement they do not deserve. 114 The
113 See Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 14, at 75 ("[S]ummary judgment fundamen-
tally alters the balance of power between plaintiffs and defendants by raising both the costs and
risks to plaintiffs in the pretrial phases of litigation while diminishing both for defendants."); cf
Stempel, supra note 40, at 108 ("Matsushita unwarrantedly strengthened summary judgment by
expanding the courts' authority to foreclose from the factfinder certain interpretations of facts
and to declare a plaintiff's theory of the case impossible as a matter of law.").
114 Jonathon T. Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J. 59, 95
(1997) ("[W]ith respect to small unmeritorious claims, a plaintiffs' attorney may hope to profit
from a case, even if the expected verdict will not cover his total litigation expenses, so long as he
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money paid out by the defendant in settlements or attorneys' fees or
both might ultimately create higher prices for consumers, losses for
shareholders, and cutbacks for employees." 5 Summary judgment
gives the faultless1 6 defendant an attractive alternative to paying un-
deserved settlements or the large lawyers' bills associated with trial.
This point is entirely true. Summary judgment has the virtue of
aiding the faultless defendant. And if all defendants were faultless,
then it would be harmful to abolish the procedure. But, of course, the
rub is that not all defendants are faultless. Because summary judg-
ment entices judges to end cases before trial and makes it harder for
any plaintiff to extract an early settlement, it helps all defendants-
those who deserve the help and those who do not. As explained in
the previous section, the plight of the virtuous defendant would be-
come a persuasive point only if we had some reason to believe that
most defendants fall into this category-a reason that no one so far
has supplied.
My claim is not that abolishing summary judgment benefits eve-
ryone. It clearly does not. I am suggesting merely that on the whole,
summary judgment costs more than it saves, both in terms of money
and fairness. For every person who benefits from this procedural de-
vice, there is another who is harmed; and in the aggregate, Americans
spend more money on litigation and receive a less fair product than
they would if summary judgment were no longer a part of the civil
justice system.
III. A Brief Sketch of the Constitutional Issue
It is unnecessary for this Article to restate the constitutional case
against summary judgment laid out so well in Suja Thomas's forth-
coming article.1 1 7 On the other hand, an article titled "Against Sum-
mary Judgment" would do its readers a disservice if it failed to
can induce the defendant to settle before trial for an amount that will cover three times the
attorney's effort up to that point.").
115 JOINT ECON. COMM., 105TH CONG., AUTO CHOICE: RELIEF FOR BUSINESSES AND CON-
SUMERS 1 (Comm. Print 1998), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/tort/relief/relief.pdf ("Ulti-
mately, the costs of the tort litigation system are passed on to consumers in the form of higher
prices and reduced profits and dividends paid to stockholders. Workers are further impacted
when excessive liability costs lower employment by diverting resources from payroll and produc-
tion purposes.").
116 1 am using "faultless" as a shorthand for "not liable." My point applies not only to cases
in which the defendant is accused wrongly of being negligent, but also to cases in which it is
accused wrongly of a strict liability offense.
117 Thomas, supra note 19.
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provide even a cursory explanation of the point that summary judg-
ment is unconstitutional.
The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that
"[i]n suits at common law,.... the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served."" 8 The reference to "common law" and the word "preserved"
have prompted the Supreme Court consistently to interpret the
Amendment to mean that litigants today must be accorded no less
restrictive access to a jury trial than were litigants in 1791 when the
Amendment was ratified.11 9 There was no such thing as summary
judgment in 1791,120 so on its face the practice stands on infirm consti-
tutional footing. It could, however, be permissible if any procedures
that did exist in 1791 created a limitation on the right to jury trial
equivalent to that which summary judgment creates in our current
system. 121
As Thomas explains, there were five relevant procedures in 1791
that limited the right to jury trial. 122 Summary judgment is constitu-
tional if and only if it equates to any of these procedures. The five
procedures were: (1) demurrer to the pleadings, (2) demurrer to the
evidence, (3) special case, (4) compulsory nonsuit, and (5) new trial.123
The first three procedures shared a crucial similarity: in each, the
judge made no assessment of the facts of the case whatsoever. The
demurrer to the pleadings was a sort of precursor to the modern mo-
tion for judgment on the pleadings (i.e., the motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6)). 124 One party admitted all facts alleged by the other
and requested judgment in its favor. The judge would then issue a
conclusive judgment one way or the other. Unlike a modern 12(b)(6)
motion, in which the case proceeds if the motion is denied, a demurrer
to the pleadings would end the case in favor of whichever litigant re-
ceived the ruling it sought. A defendant who made such a motion
would lose her right to advance her case because she would have ad-
mitted everything alleged. 125 Thus, this procedure at most limited the
right to jury trial as much as does a 12(b)(6) motion-far less than a
summary judgment motion, which allows the judge to keep the plain-
118 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
119 BRUNET ET AL., supra note 11, at 14-15; Thomas, supra note 19, at 146-47.
120 BRUNET ET AL., supra note 11, at 14-15.
121 See id.
122 See Thomas, supra note 19, at 148.
123 Id. at 148-58.
124 Id. at 149 ("Under demurrer to the pleadings, the court considered only the facts al-
leged by the opposing party.").
125 Id. at 149-50.
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tiff from a jury on the ground that the plaintiff's evidence would be
insufficient to convince a reasonable jury.
Unlike the demurrer to the pleadings, the demurrer to the evi-
dence might look to some like a variation on our current practice of
summary judgment. But there are determinative differences. After
all the evidence was presented at trial, one side could admit that all of
the other side's evidence was true and ask the judge to decide the case
either way by applying the law to those admitted facts.12 6 Like the
demurrer to the pleadings, this procedure was rare because it carried a
huge risk (one that today's summary judgment lacks): if the judge dis-
agreed with your claim to win as a matter of law, then you would lose
the case outright. Another difference from summary judgment was
that the procedure took place during the jury trial rather than before.
But by far the most important difference was that the judge was not
asked to (indeed, was required not to) weigh each side's evidence and
decide whether any reasonable jury could rule for one of the parties.
Instead, to pursue a demurrer to the evidence, one side had to admit
everything alleged by the other side. This resembles far more closely
the standard applied to a modern 12(b)(6) motion than to a motion
for summary judgment.
The third common-law procedure, the special case, also involved
a judicial determination of the law when the facts were in no dispute.
If the parties established the facts by agreement or by a jury verdict,
then they could ask the court to decide the case by a pure application
of the law to those facts.127 This differs from summary judgment for
the same reasons that the demurrer to the evidence does: the judge
makes no factual assessment, and whichever party loses at this stage
automatically loses the case.
The fourth common-law procedure, the compulsory nonsuit,
comes closer to summary judgment but still falls short. In the compul-
sory nonsuit, the judge could overrule a jury verdict if there was no
evidence to support it.128 This procedure is far more like the modern
judgment notwithstanding the verdict than it is like summary judg-
ment, because it occurred after the trial rather than before. But it
lacked even the teeth of its modern analogue because it was limited to
cases where no evidence was offered to support a necessary claim:
126 Id. at 150-51.
127 Id. at 156-57.
128 Id. at 155.
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"Whether there be any evidence, is a question for the Judge. Whether
[there be] sufficient evidence, is for the jury. ' 129
That leaves only the fifth common-law procedure, the new trial.
This is the only procedure that could plausibly be said to restrict the
right to jury trial as much as does summary judgment. Only via this
procedure could a litigant in 1791 receive a meaningful ruling from a
judge based on the sufficiency, rather than the mere existence, of the
other side's evidence. After the trial and jury verdict, the judge could
rule in effect that no reasonable jury could have reached this conclu-
sion, and accordingly he would order a new jury trial.130
Of course, the standard of review is the only similarity between
this procedure and summary judgment. The timing is different-post-
trial rather than pretrial-which arguably suggests that the old proce-
dure infringes the right to jury trial less severely. Far more important,
though, is the difference in remedy. Summary judgment causes a liti-
gant to lose her case without ever seeing a jury, whereas the new trial
procedure of the common law merely required the litigant to retry her
case in front of another jury. Regardless whether this retrying proce-
dure was wasteful or otherwise bad policy, one cannot reasonably con-
tend that such a remedy impinged the right to jury trial as much as
does the remedy in summary judgment. In 1791, a plaintiff who suf-
fered an adverse ruling from the new trial procedure would receive
two jury trials, whereas today a plaintiff who suffers an adverse ruling
at summary judgment does not even receive one.
Thus, none of the procedural mechanisms available in 1791 re-
stricted the right to jury trial to the extent that it is restricted today by
summary judgment. None allowed the judge to evaluate the conflict-
ing evidence offered by both sides and issue a judgment resolving the
case on the basis of his evaluation. Summary judgment gives the
judge this power, and it is therefore used frequently to keep cases
away from juries. Because we currently employ a procedure that de-
prives plaintiffs of jury trials in cases in which they would have had
such trials in 1791, we are violating the constitutional edict that "[i]n
suits at common law, . . . the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved.'1 31
129 Co. of Carpenters v. Hayward, (1780) 99 Eng. Rep. 241, 242 (K.B.) (emphasis added).
130 Thomas, supra note 19, at 157-58.
131 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
[Vol. 75:522
HeinOnline  -- 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 550 2006-2007
Against Summary Judgment
Conclusion
Summary judgment might be a wonderful procedure were it not
inefficient, unfair, and unconstitutional. It is inefficient because it
gives a defendant the incentive to impose the costly and time-consum-
ing burden of discovery and motions practice upon the plaintiff, the
court, and itself, rather than to settle early and avoid those costs. It is
unfair because it requires a judge to decide the case in a context in
which ruling for the defendant speeds along the judge's docket,
whereas ruling for the plaintiff potentially invites a trial that would
backlog the docket and bring both criticism and an increased wor-
kload upon the judge. Summary judgment thus creates a systemic bias
against one of the two categories of litigants (plaintiffs), arguably the
most egregious problem that can plague a civil justice system.132 Fi-
nally, summary judgment is unconstitutional because it fails to "pre-
serve[ ]" the "right of trial by jury" in civil cases as mandated by the
Seventh Amendment. When the Amendment was ratified, no proce-
dure existed that imposed the limits on the right to a jury trial that are
now imposed by summary judgment.
Powerful interests are aligned in favor of summary judgment.
Large corporations, the typical defendants in important civil litigation,
benefit from the procedure and would no doubt exert inexorable po-
litical pressure to retain it.133 Judges too might support it, though only
because they would overlook the fact that without summary judg-
ment, most cases they now adjudicate would settle early rather than
go to trial. Perhaps these interests cannot be overcome. But if that is
the case, then we should at least acknowledge that summary judgment
owes its continued existence primarily to our system's capitulation to
those who undeservedly benefit from it. In a better world, it would
not exist.
132 Cf Daniel W. Shuman & Jean A. Hamilton, Jury Service-It May Change Your Mind:
Perceptions of Fairness of Jurors and Nonjurors, 46 SMU L. REV. 449, 450 (1992) ("Perceptions
about the fairness of the judicial system are important because they reflect belief about its
legitimacy.").
133 See Gerald Burk, Corporate Power and Its Discontents, 53 BuFF. L. REV. 1419, 1419
(2006) ("Perhaps most devastating for the rule of law is that artificial persons have learned to
reshape legal doctrine to their advantage by litigating rules, rather than discrete rights. In a
word, corporate persons have become hegemonic. They shape the rules of the game, profes-
sional norms, and legal outcomes.").
2007]
HeinOnline  -- 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 551 2006-2007
